BR-Documents : art. 11171 /en
Metadata
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]- Display Name : BR 111 e 71
- Item Number : 11171
- Folder / Language : English
- Language Tag : #English
- Original PDF :
BR-Documents/English/BR-Documents 101-125/BR-Documents 111 e 71/BR 111 e 71.pdf
Contenu
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Europäisches Patentamt European Patent Office Office européen des brevets
BR 111 e/71
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]Travaux Préparatoires EPC 1973
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]Comment:
The collection represents purely an internal research tool for the purpose of Directorate Patent Law of the European Patent Office. No guarantee can be given for its completeness or correctness.
The documents produced before 1969 cannot be provided in English as this was not an official language in the period before that date. These documents therefore are provided in French and German.
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[p.3]
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE FOR THE SETTING UP OF A EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE GRANT OF PATENTS
Luxembourg, 21st April 1971 BR/111/71
- Secretariat -
PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]concerning
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities and related Articles of the draft Convention
A. The United Kingdom delegation notes that the Protocol is based on that already accepted for ESRO. In the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation the proposed EPO is different in character and function from ESRO and it is considered that some of the proposed provisions go further than is foreshadowed by Article 35 of the draft Convention in that they are not dictated by functional need. The EPO will not be subjected to political considerations in carrying out its task which is to render legal and technical services for private persons and firms on a self- financing basis. In effect the EPO will be a quasi-commercial body, rather than a body which, like ESRO, operates on behalf of governments. It will not be the kind of inter-governmental organisation which traditionally enjoys privileges and immunities. For these reasons, the United Kingdom delegation is opposed to the grant of legal immunities to the EPO and of fiscal, exchange control and other financial privileges to the EPO, its President, staff and experts and to representatives of States attending the Administrative Council. In particular, the United Kingdom dele- gation makes the following proposals.
BR/111 e/71 prk
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Article 1:
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]This should be deleted, since there is no functional need for empowering the EPO to prevent entry by police or other authorities. There will be nothing political in the work of the EPO which might be said to justify this power so as to preserve its independence. In any case, the general public is to have access to the EPO under provisions of the draft Convention.
Articles 3, 22 and 23:
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]There is confusion between these Articles and Article 40 of the draft Convention. We believe that it is necessary for the Conference to choose between the two systems and, in our opinion, the system of Article 40 is to be strongly preferred. Having regard to the character and functions of the EPO we see no good case for the system of immunities provided by the Protocol and believe that it is not reasonable to exclude people who may be damaged by a breach of contract or by negligence on the part of the EPO from recourse to the courts. We suggest therefore the deletion of Articles 3, 22 and 23.
Article 12(1)(b):
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]The United Kingdom delegation considers that the representatives of a State should not, in respect of immunity from jurisdiction, be treated differently from the President of the EPO, its staff and experts. Accordingly, we propose the addition to Article 12(1)(b) of the following:-
"The immunity shall not apply, however, in the case of a motor traffic offence committed by a representative, nor in the case of damage caused by a motor vehicle belonging to or driven by him".
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Articles 4,5 and 7(2):
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]The United Kingdom delegation considers that these fiscal privileges should not be accorded the EPO. There is no functional need for them and, since the EPO is to operate on a self-financing basis, withholding of such privileges would not contravene the recognised principle that the host State should not benefit from contributions made to an organisation by the other States. We believe it is generally accepted that fiscal privileges are inappropriate for organisations having the character of the EPO and point out that the grant of such privileges would have the effect of subsidising applicants and patentees out of tax payer's money. These provisions should be deleted. As a consequence, Articles 6 and 7(1) should also be deleted.
Article 9:
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]We regard the EPO as a quasi-commercial body. It follows that we think Article 9 should be deleted, since it has the effect of granting special exchange control privileges which are appropriate only to organisations financed by States' contributions.
Articles 12(1)(f) and (g), 13, 14(e) and (g) and 15(c):
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]These provisions confer fiscal, exchange control and other financial privileges on the President of the EPO, its staff and experts and representatives of States on the Administrative Council. We understand it to be generally accepted that the justification for granting fiscal and other financial privileges to personnel derives from the principles which justify the grant of such privileges to the organisation itself. It follows from what we have said about the proposed EPO privileges that we now propose the deletion of these provisions also.
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Article 16:
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]Although no draft has been proposed, we note that Working Party II has approved the principle of non-taxation of staff. The United Kingdom delegation does not agree to this and takes the view that staff should be attracted to join the EPO by appropriate remuneration and conditions of service.
B. In order to avoid any doubt, the United Kingdom delegation thinks it may be useful to define "archives" in Article 2 as "including, inter alia, all records, correspondence and documents (including unpublished patent applications) belonging to or held by the European Patent Office".
C. We have some doubts as to whether two States are enough to bring the Protocol into force and, in any event, suggest that one of the States referred to in Article 29 should be the State where the EPO is located.
D. Finally, the United Kingdom delegation points out that Part III, Chapter I of the draft Convention mixes up legal status, organisational matters and languages and that reference is made to the Protocol in both Articles 35 and 35p, neither reference being sufficiently comprehensive. We think it would be useful to have a separate Chapter entitled "Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities" and to base the drafting on the ESRO and ELDO Conventions.
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